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Postmodernist discourse has become central to literary criticism in the 
1990s. Unlike many other literary discourses, it was never formally 
announced, yet beginning in the late 1980s (with Mikhail Epstein’s 
articles) it took over almost all literary publications and effectively led to a 
new polarization of literary forces. If, during the first years of Perestroika, 
literary and cultural factions were divided primarily along political lines, 
with Western liberal sympathizers and anti-Communists on one side, and 
nationalist defenders of Communism on the other, then by the middle of 
the 1990s debate about postmodernism had split the liberals into those 
who sided with postmodernism and those who backed the “realist 
tradition.” For example, while the journal Znamia [The Banner] welcomed 
postmodernist experiments in its pages, such pioneers of 1960s liberalism 
and the dissident movement of the 1970s and ‘80s as the journals Novyi 
Mir [New World] and Kontinent [The Continent] tried to exclude the anti-
realists in every possible way. [2] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a standard-
bearer of Russian anti-Communism from the 1960s onward, expresssed 
his indignation regarding postmodernism in 1993: 
Thus we witness, over history’s various thresholds, a recurrence of one 
and the same perilous anti-cultural phenomenon, with its rejection of and 
contempt for all foregoing traditions, and with its mandatory hostility 
toward whatever is universally accepted. Before, it burst upon us with the 
fanfares and gaudy flags of ‘futurism’; today the term ‘postmodernism’ is 
applied. . . . There is no God, there is no truth, the universe is chaotic, all 
is relative -- ’the world as text,’ a text any postmodernist is willing to 
compose. How clamorous it all is, but also -- how helpful. [3] 
At the same time, even analysts and defenders of postmodernism could 
not unite; some, such as Mikhail Epstein [4] and Boris Grois [5] , 
delineated Russian postmodernism as a small circle of Moscow 
conceptualists, while others, such as Viacheslav Kuritsyn [6] , ascribed to 
postmodernism almost all at least somewhat significant literary 
phenomena, including the selfsame Solzhenitsyn. A third group, which 
included the critic Vladimir Novikov, refused to view Russian 
postmodernism as an independent literary event at all, and found in it 
only evidence of the modernist and avant-garde aesthetics. [7] 
In the end, postmodernist discourse exceeded the boundaries of literature 
itself and became a vivid illustration of intellectual chaos, as the subject of 
discourse became as myriad and nebulous as its language. Minister of the 
Interior Anatolii Kulikov (who could hardly be considered an academician) 
was not so far off the mark when he publicly reacted to some absurdly 
convoluted situation in 1997 with the words “This is some kind of 
postmodernism!” [8] 
The present author has also weighed in on these arguments and even 
wrote a book on Russian postmodernist prose. [9] In this article I would 
like to summarize some of this protracted discourse and examine Russian 
postmodernism from the semiotic viewpoint, as one of the crucial 
crossroads of Russian cultural dynamics in the twentieth century. 
I would like to argue that, unlike Western postmodernism, the Russian 
variety did not strive to counter the modernist tradition; rather, it 
attempted to resurrect it after many decades of sociorealism’s cultural 
monopoly. This was precisely the intent of Russian postmodernism’s 
seminal texts, which subsequently became its classics: Moscow to the End 
of the Line by Venedikt Erofeev (1969); Pushkin’s House by Andrei Bitov 
(1971); A School for Foolsby Sasha Sokolov (1973-75); and the early 
conceptualist poets, such as V. Ufliand, Vsesvolod Nekrasov, Henry 
Sapgir, and Evgenii Kropivnitsky. These literary experiments were 
continued and elaborated by the so-called “underground” writers, who 
surfaced during the first years of Perestroika: Dmitri Prigov, Lev 
Rubinstein, Timur Kibirov, Alexander Eremenko, Vladimir Sorokin, Viktor 
Erofeev, Evgenii Popov, and Alexander Ivanchenko. By the end of the 
1980s and beginning of the ‘90s, other postmodernist writers, such as 
Tatiana Tolstaya, Vladimir Sharov, Viktor Pelevin, Viacheslav Pietsukh, 
Valeria Nabrikova, and Dmitri Galkovsky had made their debut. 
As it evolved, Russian postmodernism rejected more and more consciously 
a key element of the modernist and avant-garde aesthetic -- 
themythologization of reality. In the modernist and avant-garde tradition, 
the creation of an individual poetic myth, which always hearkened back to 
some authoritative archetype or model, signified the creation of an 
alternate reality, or more precisely, an alternate eternity -- one which 
could overcome the senselessness, violence, oppression, and horror of 
life. The myth symbolized the ultimate form of existence because it was 
created freely and consciously by the artist, and thus embodied the 
concept of freedom itself. Postmodernism deliberately aimed to destroy all 
mythologies, viewing them as the ideological foundation of utopianism and 
all attempts at mind-control in general -- enforcing a single, absolute, and 
rigidly hierarchical model of truth, eternity, liberty, and happiness. 
Beginning with a critique of Communist mythology (socialist art in the 
visual sphere, and subsequently in literature), postmodernism soon turned 
on the conceptual myths of Russian classical literature and the Russian 
avant-garde, and later to the myths fostered by contemporary mass 
culture. However, in shattering existing mythologies, postmodernism 
strives to reassemble the pieces into a new, non-hierarchical, non-
absolute, playful mythology, since the postmodernist writer views myth as 
the most stable and a-historical form of human consciusness and culture. 
Thus postmodernism’s strategy with regard to myth might be defined 
more properly as deconstruction than destruction -- a restructuring along 
different, counter-mythological principles. 
The most concrete expression of this strategy in Russian postmodernism 
is the tendency to create unstable, frequently conflicting and even 
explosivehybrids -- compromises formed between both aesthetic and 
ontological categories, which are traditionally perceived as incompatible 
and even antithetical. These might be paradoxical “compromises” between 
life and death (as in works by Bitov, Erofeev, Sokolov); fantasy and reality 
(Tolstaya, Pelevin); memory and forgetting (Ilia Kabakov, Sharov); order 
and absurdity (Viktor Erofeev, Pietsukh); the personal and the faceless 
(Prigov, Evgenii Poppov, Kibirov); eternal archetype and vulgar stereotype 
(Sorokin). The search for ontological junctures forces the postmodernist 
writer to build his poetics upon unstable aesthetic compromises between 
the elevated and lowly, mockery and pathos, wholeness and 
fragmentation, and so on. This central principle of Russian postmodernism 
-- simultaneously structuring and deconstructive -- is defined below as 
the paralogism of Russian postmodernism. 
This paralogism, which aims to form eruptive compromises among 
contradictory ideas and cultural discourses, was the first in the twentieth 
century to create such an open (“systematic”) alternative to the traditional 
binary model of Russian cultural evolution, in which, according to Iurii 
Lotman and Boris Uspensky, “change occurs as a radical negation of the 
preceding state. The new does not arise out of structurally ‘unused’ 
reserve, but results from a transformation of the old, a process of turning 
it inside out. Thus, repeated transformation can in fact lead to 
the regeneration of archaic forms.” [10] 
In a certain sense the postmodern cultural aesthetic turns out to be more 
“clever” than its own authors. If the Russian postmodernist aesthetic 
creates paralogical compromises, then the postmodernist writers, obeying 
the intertia of Russia’s cultural tradition, generally organized their 
relations to the non-postmodernist world within the literary context, 
viewing readers and writers of the older generations along the principles 
of binary opposition: for them, as for the Russian avant-garde at the turn 
of the century, self-assertion became inseparable from “full-scale 
destruction” of the opposition, which was understood primarily to be the 
Russian realist tradition. In the words of Lotman and Uspensky, Russian 
postmodernists “did not simply accept a new system of values, replacing 
the old one, but rather wrote the old into the new -- with a minus sign.” 
This inner contradiction between the social and aesthetic aspects in 
Russian postmodernism is but one of many characterizing the complexity, 
drama, and scale of the postmodernist crossroad in the history of Russian 
culture. 
The “Paralogism” of Russian Postmodernism 
What unites these disparate versions of Russian postmodernism? What do 
Nabokov’s Lolita and Viktor Pelevin’s novels, for example, have in 
common? The present study attempts to describe that philosophical-
aesthetic model which characterizes Russian postmodernist texts greatly 
removed from one another in time and quality. I would like to emphasize 
that this search does not aim to unify such a widely varied phenomenon 
as Russian postmodernism, but rather to reveal its aesthetic code -- 
which, on the one hand, is sufficiently diverse, and on the other, creates a 
common semantic field in which the dialogue among different individual 
conceptions of Russian postmodernism might unfold. Such a code 
undoubtedly belongs to the universal language of postmodern philosophy 
and aesthetics -- in this sense, Russian postmodernism also belongs to the 
universal postmodernist culture. Yet a focus on certain aspects of this 
language differentiates the specificity of Russian postmodernism 
compared with, say, the European or North American versions. 
A key element of the Russian postmodern code is the “paralogism” -- a 
term introduced by J. F. Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition to describe 
a new type of logic which emerged alongside contemporary science: 
Postmodern science--by concerning itself with such things as 
undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by 
incomplete information, fracta, catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes--is 
theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, 
and paradoxical. It is changing its meaning of the wordknowledge, while 
expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the 
known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation that has 
nothing to do with maximized performance, but has as its basis difference 
understood as paralogy. [11] 
To clarify this category, Lyotard emphasizes that “paralogism” counters 
the ideas of dialogue and consensus. The paralogism arises out of despair 
of achieving consensus on any issue. It embodies “a power that 
destabilizes the capacity for explanation, manifested in the promulgation 
of new norms for understanding.” [12] As Steven Connor remarks, 
paralogism -- in the given interpretation -- is “contradictory reasoning, 
designed to shift the structures of reason itself.” [13] 
Like any normal postmodernist aesthetic, Russian postmodernist culture 
paradoxically bases its paralogism on the unhinging of the mighty 
“structures of reason” which inform modernist culture, such as binary 
oppositional thought. Yet unlike the Western experience, the Russian 
cultural model lacks a tradition of resolving opposition through 
compromise, or more precisely, tends toward a tradition of intolerance for 
compromise of any sort, with roots stretching back into Russian 
medievalism. [14] According to Lotman and Uspensky, Russian culture 
always moves toward a radical break with the past, which reveals the 
unwavering maximalism of its consciousness, rejecting the very idea of 
compromise, acknowledging heaven or hell (and periodically, in the course 
of cultural evolution, renaming the previous hell as heaven and vice-
versa), but excluding the concept of purgatory on principle. The 
combination of binary thinking with intolerance of compromise was 
exemplified in the twentieth century not only by the Marxist “dialectic” 
[15] and socialist realism, but by the oppositional “critical realism” of 
Solzhenitsyn, Astafiev, and most of the 1960s writers as well. One has 
only to remember Solzhenitsyn’s attacks on “our pluralists” in the 1970s. 
And in the 1990s the programmatic declarations of a young champion of 
the “old realism” are quite emblematic of the spirit of intolerance toward 
compromise: 
Any intermediate phase between realism and modernism leads to the 
death of realism. Its goals and meaning are too precise and suffer no 
relativism. If an artist throws himself to the whims of chance, to ‘self- 
expression,’ then he has lost his faith in the world and its workings, and 
now his goals lie in an entirely different realm. . . . [16] 
For this reason postmodernism is forced to build its own paralogism in 
Russia, pushing away both from the logic of binary opposition per se and 
from the tradition of intolerance toward compromise which characterizes 
Russian culture as a whole. Hence Russian postmodernism, unlike the 
Western variety: 
1. concentrates precisely on seeking compromises and dialogues between 
opposite poles, on forming “intersections” among philosophical and 
aesthetic categories which are incompatible in the “classical,” modernist, 
and dialectic consciousness; 
2. forms compromises which are principally paralogical: they retain an 
eruptive quality, they are unstable and problematic, simmering with 
tension, begetting a contradictory whole. The very fact of such conceptual 
creations is emblematic of paralogism’s central characteristic: 
“contradictory reasoning, designed to shift the structures of reason itself.” 
Due to this combination, Russian postmodernism itself is often perceived 
as an “oxymoron” (M. Perloff), an invalid phenomenon (C. Emerson, N. N. 
Shneidman), and, more precisely, as a particular kind of “paralogical” 
paradox, especially since, according to Lyotard, paralogism in science 
aims to automodelize (“theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, 
catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical”). However, it seems 
impossible to understand either the specificity or the creativity of Russian 
postmodernist philosophy outside this illogical combination of compromise 
and its concomitant instability and potential explosiveness. 
Tellingly, the most meaningful images of Russian postmodernism are 
many-layered combinations of disparate paralogical compromises. Such, 
for example, is the image of garbage which forms a central motif in the 
poetics of Ilia Kabakov. In dialogue with Boris Grois, [17] Kabakov 
characterizes garbage as the philosophical compromise between life and 
death: at first he states that “garbage is closer to death; it is death 
visualized” (320); on the next page he says that “life itself is but a pile of 
rubbish” (321). Besides, Kabakov uses garbage as a “metaphor for . . . 
ordinary, gray, plodding daily existence, which is above all eventless” 
(322) and simultaneously as an embodiment of the most personal and 
intimate: “making the leap from the faceless and anonymous into the 
intimate world which is mine alone” (328). Garbage also occupies the 
intermediate zone between memory and forgetfulness: “It is, in itself, 
some sort of intermediary object, cleaved in two, with one end directed to 
memory and the other to forgetting” (329). Kabakov’s discussions of 
garbage form one of the brightest examples of postmodernist paralogism. 
The logical Grois’s response is also highly expressive: “There is an English 
saying that ‘you can’t make an omlet without breaking a few eggs.’ It 
seems to me that this is basically the problem you have put to yourself” 
(325). 
Essentially, this is a problem which Russian postmodernism as a whole 
“puts to itself.” It delineates postmodernism’s place in contemporary 
culture. Of course it would be difficult, if not impossible, to compile a 
catalogue of every paralogical compromise enacted in the works of 
Russian postmodernists. I will limit myself to examining the most 
important of these compromises, in my view--those which have made the 
most vivid mark on postmodernist semantics and poetics. 
Simulacrum-Reality 
The category of “simulation” first introduced by Jean Baudrillard is 
remarkably appropriate to the Russian version of postmodernism. Having 
fixed the blurred boundaries between signified objects and their referents, 
Baudrillard asserts that in the postmodern era, reality is replaced by a 
web of “simulacrae”--self-referential complexes of signifiers which no 
longer correspond to anything in the real world. Thus arises a 
“hyperreality of simulacrae.” The expansion of language takes place 
through a system of signifiers with no object. Simulacrae direct human 
behavior, perception, and in the long run, consciousness, which in turn 
leads to the “death of subjectivity”: the human “I” is also constructed 
from an aggregate of simulacrae. [18] The search for correspondence 
between Baudrillard’s “simulacrae” and sociorealism’s sham worldview has 
been conducted exhaustively throughout Russian postmodernist studies. 
One can easily find direct illustrations of Baudrillard’s philosophical theses 
in such early examples of Moscow conceptualism (of the late 1960s and 
early ‘70s) as Erik Bulatov’s paintings or Dmitri Prigov’s poetic cycles. 
Yet at the same time, even the work of such acknowledged conceptualist 
leaders as Ilia Kabakov does not quite fit neatly into this categorical 
framework. A telling discrepancy arises in Kabakov’s dialogue with Boris 
Grois about the installation “Fly with Wings.” In Grois’s view, the 
installation is a means to expose the simulation, artifice, and mechanical 
glue holding reality together at the seams. Yet Kabakov objects: 
I disagree. In fact, it seems to me that the mechanical, inorganic entity, 
that conglomerate which the elements of the installation comprise, is 
combined into a new, organic whole, which cleaves and doubles in our 
consciousness, remaining what it is -- that is, a collection of buckets, 
sticks, and all kinds of rubbish -- and at the same time unfolding a new 
event before our eyes, a new whole and a new creative endeavor . . . . I 
would like to point out once more that the installation reaffirms and 
regenerates the existence of real artistic space, which is entirely lost in 
painting . . . the reality which painting has lost is reestablished in 
the installation. [19] 
This dichotomy points up the double meaning of simulacrum as a category 
in the postmodernist aesthetic. On the one hand, the flow of simulacrae 
eats away at reality, turns it into a theater of shadows, a collection of 
universally accessible illusions, a phenomenon of absence. The first, heroic 
-- or rather, analytical -- stage of Russian postmodernism (which includes 
the Lianozov school, Moscow conceptualism, and Andrei Bitov’s 
novel Pushkin’s House, with its anti-hero, the genius of smoke and 
mirrors, Mitishatiev) aimed to expose the sham and pretense of that which 
is considered reality. Yet it soon became evident that the existence 
absorbed by simulacrae might also be squeezed out of them (in direct 
correlation with Pasternak’s well-known metaphor): simulacrae allow one 
to recreate reality, not even mechanically, but organically; herein lies the 
foundation of Russian postmodernism’s “synthetic” stage, or rather its 
“synthetic” version. The seeds of this interpretation of the category of 
simulacrum might be traced as far back as Venedikt Erofeev’s long 
poem Moscow to the End of the Line (1969). Erofeev achieves an anti-
simulative effect paradoxically; by combining fragments of very distant 
cultural systems, he proves that not only the language of Soviet ideology, 
but also the language of Russian symbolism and even the language of 
today’s social “nadir” play equal roles in creating that which Baudrillard 
terms “hyperreality.” “Olga Erdeli,” the sacramental question of what 
really killed Pushkin, the angels, God dressed in “blue lightning,” the 
“gossip’s” white lilac cocktails, foot-odor remedies, and “life should be 
lived in such a way that the years one has passed so aimlessly do not 
cause too much pain”-- all of these constructions appear equal in their 
simulativeness as they are expressed in the poem’s language and 
narrative structure. However, another remarkable effect of Erofeev’s work 
lies in his magical ability to achieve an organic symbiosis between these 
discursive fragments; they engage in a highly unusual dialogue, frequently 
within the space of a single passage, finally and paradoxically recreating 
reality. For example: 
And later (listen carefully), later, after they had found out why Pushkin 
died, I gave them Alexander Blok’s poem ‘The Nightingale Garden’ to 
read. There, at the center of the poem -- if you throw out all of the 
perfumed shoulders, the unilluminated mists, the rosy towers in smoky 
vestments -- there at the center of the poem you find the lyric hero 
dismissed from work for drunkenness, whoring, and absenteeism. I told 
them, ‘It’s a very contemporary book.’ I told them, ‘You’ll find it useful.’ 
And so? They read it. But, in spite of everything, it had a depressing effect 
on them -- Freshen-Up disappeared immedidately from all the stores. It’s 
impossible to say why, but blackjack was forgotten, vermouth was 
forgotten, Sheremetievo International Field was forgotten, and Freshen-
Up triumphed. Everyone drank only Freshen-Up. 
Oh, to be carefree! Oh heavenly birds, who neither sow nor reap. Oh, the 
lilies of the field are dressed more beautifully than Solomon! They drank 
up all the Freshen-Up from Dolgoprudnyi Station to Sheremetievo 
International. [20] 
The stylistic trajectory of this fragment might be interpreted along the 
following parabola. At first, we are ironically presented with high poetic 
style (“perfumed shoulders and unilluminated mists and rosy towers in 
smoky vestments”), which then veers sharply downward, first into vulgar 
colloquialism (“drunkenness, whoring, and absenteeism”) and second into 
a parody of a well-known quote of Lenin’s (“It’s a very contemporary 
book”). Practically speaking, the author demonstrates three types of 
reality simulation here: the poetic, the ideological, and the so-called 
folksy-practical (drunkenness, whoring, and absenteeism from work all 
represent absence -- absence of consciousness, of love, of labor). But the 
final part of the fragment presents an ennobling return into poetic 
tonality; in fact, the cologne called “Freshen-Up” associatively rhymes 
with “The Nightingale Garden” (“Freshen-Up triumphed”) and is written 
into a Biblical stylistic context (“Oh, the lilies of the field are dressed more 
beautifully than Solomon. . . .”). Here, the lofty comes down not to be 
discredited, but to take on a new form of existence -- a different state of 
reality -- in the “lower” realm. It appears that this very recreation of 
reality from mutually reflective and repellent simulacrae engenders that 
crucial quality of Erofeev’s poem, which Vladimir Muraviev called “counter-
irony” and Mikhail Epstein described as “the carnival’s aftermath,” when 
all former values “are upended by the carnival and then restored in some 
new, ‘noumenal’ dimension.” [21] 
In the dialogue regarding the “Fly with Wings” exhibition, Ilia Kabakov 
underscores that “the material presence of reality in art is absolutely tied 
to the absence of reality in life itself.” [22] Kabakov describes this 
“absence of reality in life itself” in an aggressive image of an all-absorbing 
emptiness (a theme which acquires independent meaning in the 
postmodernist aesthetic): “It sticks, grows together, sucks the marrow 
from existence; its thick, viscuous, nauseating anti-energy is drained 
vampirically from the surrounding environment.” [23] 
This same theme appears in Erofeev’s poem: not only the train, but the 
narrative itself follows a circular route, and each essential motif appears 
twice, both in a positive and negative light (this is particularly evident in 
the example of the angels and the silence of God), thereby cancelling each 
other out. In the end, only emptiness remains; Erofeev leaves us with 
“darkness” closing in (absolute night takes over outside the train’s 
windows at the end of the chapter which brings together the two points of 
Venichka’s trip: “Petushki. Garden Circle”) and time (“What do you need 
time for, Venichka? . . . Once you had a heavenly paradise, you could 
have found out the time last Friday, but now your heavenly paradise is no 
more, what do you need with the time?” p. 155) and Venichka’s 
murderers, seemingly born of thin air. 
Of course, the simulacrum theme is also distinctly present in the 
modernist aesthetic (one need only recall Andrei Bely’s domino imagery, 
the symbolic role of masquerade in the writing of Blok and Fiodor 
Sologub; later, the theme of false reality will become a fundamental 
leitmotif in Konstantin Vaginov’s novels). Thus, for instance, all of 
Nabokov’s Russian novels and the early American works clearly trace an 
anti-thesis of vulgar pseudo-reality and true perception, created in the 
protagonist’s imagination -- witness Martin Edelweiss, Godunov-
Cherdintsev, Cincinnatus C., Sebastian Knight (and later, his brother), 
Adam Krug. 
However, in Lolita (1955), a novel which played a colossal role in 
American postmodernist history, this anti-thesis is lifted away: Humbert’s 
reality, constructed as a projection of the modernist myth, and Lolita’s, 
constructed from the vulgar stereotypes of mass culture, collide and 
destroy each other--leaving behind, instead of a true “reality,” a pile of 
scorched rubbish (this motif frames the narrative). A funnel of emptiness 
sucks in first Lolita, then Humbert. It is telling that Humbert is not the 
only one to sense the presence of this void behind the welcome film of 
simulacrae: “the side door banged open full-blast and a roar of black 
eternity rushed in, the howling wind drowning out the shriek of solitary 
ruin” [24] (thus Humbert describes his state of mind after losing Lolita), 
yet one of his most unbearable heartbreaking memories is of Lolita herself 
“very serenely and seriously” telling a girlfriend, “You know, what’s so 
dreadful about dying is that you are completely on your own.” [25] Even 
the fact that Lolita dies “in childbed, giving birth to a stillborn girl on 
Christmas Day” (6) reminds us once again that it is not so much a matter 
of death as of the metaphorical impossibility of life; Lolita cannot continue 
to live even through her daughter, once she has seen what really lies 
behind the “fence of stereotypes,” behind all of the lofty poetic fantasies. 
The postmodern simulacrae do not contradict reality, but its absence -- 
that is, emptiness. Paradoxically (paralogically), these simulacrae become 
a creative source of reality only when their simulative, false, fictitious, 
illusory nature is acknowledged -- only on the condition of denial. 
Thus, for instance, Vladimir Sorokin uses his socio-artistic novellas, novels 
(Marina’s Thirtieth Romance, The Hearts of the Four, The Novel), and 
intricately structured books (The Norm) not only to expose the sham at 
the core of the standard sociorealist text, but to reconstruct the ritual-
mythological complexes in sociorealist discourse, which remain hidden in 
the cultural subconscious. In the end, he manages to transform standard, 
schematic plots into nauseatingly naturalistic descriptions of bloody, 
primal ritual, reconstructing a primordial reality which predates all 
signifiers, much like the impossible “theatre of cruelty” which Antonin 
Artaud once imagined so wistfully. 
In his quasi-historical novels Rehearsals (1991), Sooner or Later (1993), 
and How Could I Not Regret. . .. (1995), Vladimir Sharov seems to parody 
the utopian and mythological subtexts of twentieth-century Russia’s most 
authoritative ideologies to an almost grotesque degree of detail. For 
example, inSooner or Later the Russian revolution is literally 
masterminded by Madame de Stahl, who (in Sharov’s novel) possesses 
the secret of immortality and grants power to her lovers -- the philosopher 
Nikolai Fiodorov, the composer Skriabin, Stalin (who is simultaneously 
Madame de Stahl’s son--hence the pseudonym). However, unlike other 
quasi-historical novelists (such as Valeria Zalotukha, author of The Great 
Indian Liberation Crusade; Dmitri Lipskerov, author of Forty Years in 
Changzhou; Iurii Buida, author of Boris and Gleb), Sharov writes 
compellingly and earnestly. His fantastical tales echo the monotonous, 
dispassionate tone of historical research, documents, and events. The 
effect was so realistic that a few critics (S. Kostyrko, I. Rodnianskaia) 
attacked the author for “distorting historical truth,” thereby confirming the 
simulacrum’s power to engender reality -- of course, a “false” reality, or a 
paralogical reality if one assumes the traditional point of view. 
Viktor Pelevin’s work proves even more telling in this area, as some of the 
most popular and “readable” postmodern literature of the 1990s. Pelevin’s 
characters struggle as fiercely as “Russian schoolboys” with the 
fundamental question: What is reality? For these protagonists 
(incidentally, Pelevin is the youngest of the Russian postmodernists), 
realizing the illusory nature of their environment is merely a starting point 
for their ruminations. Pelevin does not explore reality’s transformation into 
simulacrum, but rather the reverse process -- the birth of reality from 
simulacrum. Essentially, his intent is exactly opposite the basic postulates 
of postmodernist philosophy. 
Yes -- life is most likely a dream (the short story “The Blue Lantern”), a 
computer game (the tale The Prince of the State Planning Commission), 
fryer chickens moving along an incubatory conveyor belt (The Hermit and 
the Six-Fingered One), and even the senseless “drone of insects” (the 
novel Life of Insects). With unmatched virtuosity, Pelevin plays up a smug 
middle-manager’s gradual metamorphosis into a tank-driver and a beach 
bum’s into a dragonfly. Yet Pelevin does not write from satirical 
motivations; by combining, for instance, human passions with the 
instincts of an insect, he tries to peer behind the destructive similarity 
behind people’s meaningless existence and a moth’s blind race toward a 
flame. As the protagonist of his earlier work, The Prince of the State 
Planning Commission, puts it, even if the result of a lifelong quest turns 
out to be hollow, a sham, a cardboard cutout, still “when a man spends so 
much time and energy on the journey and finally gets there, he can no 
longer see his destination as it really is . . . and even that is not correct, 
because there is no ‘really.’ Let’s just say that he cannot allow himself to 
see.” [26] For this reason, Omon Ra (Pelevin’s protagonist in the novel of 
the same name [1993]), having realized that the space mission for which 
he sacrificed his legs, for which his friends gave their lives, is nothing but 
a secret play staged somewhere in the underground labyrinths of the 
Moscow metro, remains a space hero, much like the Egyptian god who 
overcame death. The mission’s ‘reality’ does not matter; for Omon Ra it is 
an event resembling an ancient rite of passage through terrible trials and 
temporary death. Even Pelevin’s scarab beetles in Life of Insects (1994), 
whose entire world consists of a dung pile, are not a mockery of the 
human quest for the meaning of life; on the contrary, Pelevin imbues 
them with an almost grotesque solemnity, for even manure can become 
meaningful as the site of conscious drama, pain, hope, despair, 
persistence. 
The formation of paralogical compromise between simulacrum and reality 
-- an unstable zone where simulacrum constantly engenders reality while 
reality turns into simulacrum -- defines Russian postmodernism’s 
mechanism of aesthetic perception. In turn, this process is inextricably 
tied with the following problematic opposition 
between fragmentation and integrity, which generally lies at the structural 
core of these aesthetic principles. 
Fragmentation-Integrity 
In Soviet artistic theory of the 1970s and ‘80s, a widespread belief held 
that the “integrity of a particular work expresses the all-encompassing 
nature of reality itself, the result of an artist’s creative perception of life, 
unearthing the dialectic unity of the real world . . . in all of its 
contradictions and junctures” and that “types of art should be understood 
first and foremost as types of artistic integrity.” [27] This category of 
“integrity” also countered the structural immanence of the text and the 
extra-textual mandates of sociorealism -- party line, ideology, class 
struggle. [28] That almost magical significance which Russian scholars 
imparted to this category might only be compared with the semantically 
loaded use of the word “discourse” by their Western colleagues. At the 
same time, it appears axiomatic that the postmodernist aesthetic 
preaches a movement “from creation to text,” from the illusion of an 
integral worldview (which the more radical postmodernist theorists define 
as totalitarian by nature) to a fragmented text, which can be compared 
only with itself. Postmodernism’s theoretical and practical rebellion against 
all ideologies based on Unity or Hierarchy necessarily targeted the 
category of creative integrity. Yet, on the other hand, the Russian 
fascination with integrity could not help but transform the postmodernist 
rebellion against “totalities” as well. 
It is interesting, for instance, that even the most radical examples of 
integral decay and dissolution in Russian postmodernist texts generally 
lack independent significance and appear to be mechanisms for 
propagating various “non-classical” models of integrity. 
Thus, we see a radical attack on “integrity” in Ilia Kabakov’s “tabular 
poetry”: 
One might describe ‘tabular poetry’ like this: every square of a grid or 
table is filled . . . with one, or more rarely, two or three words. The 
‘reader’ is asked not to ‘read,’ but to ‘look at’ the entire field all at once, 
as one might view a drawing or a picture... Of course, any line-by-line 
reading of ‘tabular poetry’ loses its meaning. [29] 
However, this poetic ‘table’ is merely a background on which Kabakov 
superimposes a picture of a fly -- the “extra element” which spurs the 
reader to perceive this random collection of words as a “whole”: 
This principle of adding an ‘extra element’ . . . lies in the fact that a 
meaningless, random image stimulates and activates whatever it appears 
extraneous to. We have already mentioned that ‘tabular poetry’ depends 
upon a reader’s unified, summary gaze to view the entire table as a 
whole. Yet the actual practice of examining tables (or any schematic 
drawings, graphs, and so on) does not allow for such viewing; instead, we 
are forced to scrutinize every square, every graph separately. This is 
where the role of the fly as activator of the ‘whole’ becomes so critical. In 
relation to this perplexing unknown factor the ‘poetic table’ coalesces into 
a complex but integrated organism, enclosed in a single frame, in which 
each word -- this is important -- appears ‘equal’ to the rest. This is a key 
condition of ‘tabular poetry’’s intended effect. [30] 
Of course, the very idea of “tabular poetry” hardly warrants much serious 
scrutiny, yet it is highly illustrative of the artistic mindset of Russian 
postmodernism, which discerns in the negation of familiar connections 
only the path toward a new non-hierarchical integrity. In truth, Kabakov’s 
invention was also realized with a few small variations in Lev Rubinstein’s 
“card poetry.” These collected fragments, lines, or paragraphs, each 
printed on a separate card (some of the cards were left blank) are 
incoherent only at first glance. First, as Andrei Zorin remarked, the very 
process of flipping cards implies a certain cadence, while the cards 
themselves count out rhythm and meaning. [31] Second, this apparent 
formal incoherence makes the question of connection among these 
seemingly random elements of meaning the most important problem 
posed by Rubinstein’s poetry. As careful analysis [32]proves, Rubinstein’s 
entire text can be divided into several locally rhythmic patterns, which 
either develop in a parallel fashion or replace one another. It is also 
important to note that these rhythmic structures always interconnect and 
reflect one another, forming a specific non-linear dialogue. Rubinstein’s 
rhythm plastically embodies his integral model--the arrangements 
constantly replacing one another are built into a random and seemingly 
chaotic enumeration of every possible thing. Rhythmic structure acquires 
in Rubinstein’s work a particular philosophical meaning: his text generally 
becomes a dynamic model of self-consciousness. This model is far from 
classical, for Rubinstein’s “I” turns out to be a point, or rather a field of 
intersection among various inharmonic, contradictory rhythms; this seems 
to be chaos, a cacophany, but simultaneously a combination of foreign 
and repeating elements of being which can never be duplicated, 
everything from faces and words to objects and symbols. The quest for 
this combination, the construction of its design, comes not post facto but 
rather from within any act of self-awareness, here and now, in every one 
of Rubinstein’s texts. In this sense, the deconstruction of Rubinstein’s 
work aims to create a new type of integrity. Rubinstein himself says that 
“the reconstruction of language in my texts imbues it with new positive 
codes. I seriously believe that the main vector in my work is positive, 
which many would doubt.” [33] 
The paralogical fusion between fragmentation and integrity is particularly 
evident in the importance ascribed to the categories of emptiness, the 
semantic abyss, and even death in Russian postmodernism. These very 
figures becomes the base structure for fragmentation, as opposed to a 
single, unbroken integrity. 
Having analyzed Ilia Kabakov’s poetics, Mikhail Epstein concludes that 
Kabakov assigns a double semantic meaning to emptiness: in one sense 
(discussed above) it is an aggressive ravenous anti-energy, resisting the 
artist who would create reality from simulacrum. Yet emptiness is present 
not only beyond the bounds, but also within Kabakov’s texts: 
Kabakov’s world is a porous body designed to allow emptiness inside and 
then to trap it within the work. . . . As one tries to establish the difference 
between these two interpretations, one notices that 
‘bloodsucking’ emptiness is inherent to the world surrounding the artist, 
which he must also share with all the world. On the contrary, ‘sunlit’ 
emptiness, which is the same as fullness, only appears in the whiteness of 
the artist’s paintings, glowing from beneath letters and brushstrokes. . . . 
One is left to suppose that the artist not only confuses the two kinds of 
emptiness and goes astray in his interpretations, but that his secret intent 
is precisely this transformation of one emptiness into another. [34] 
Since Kabakov’s work is always built upon the combination of text with 
the visual plane, Epstein’s thoughts, which tear apart the visual plane’s 
integrity, come to express that “sunlit” emptiness in the world of color, 
while the colors which condemn text to an inescapable fragmentation play 
the same role in the world of words. 
Thematically, death plays an analogous role in Bitov’s Pushkin’s 
House, Venedikt Erofeev’s Moscow to the End of the Line, and Sasha 
Sokolov’s School for Fools. On the one hand, all three of these works 
present death as the inevitable product of an environment in which 
simulacrae leave no room for “reality.” However, in all three texts the 
direct result of total simulation becomes the increasing homogeneity -- 
that is, uniformity -- of “lofty” and “lowbrow,” “tragic” and “comical”: the 
Russian classical canon and the fictitious existence of Liova Odoevtsev (in 
Bitov’s novel); the Christian (among others) tradition and recipes for 
fantastic cocktails brewed from deodorants, cologne, and brake fluid 
(in Moscow to the End of the Line); the romantic image of the insane poet 
and the whiny half-wit shrieking and wailing into empty barrels (in School 
for Fools). 
Thus, both Bitov and Sokolov use death as a common denominator -- in 
the former case, connecting and allowing for mutual exchange between 
the afterlife of classical culture and grubby “modernity”; in the latter, as 
the basis for metamorphoses occurring between the chaotic poetic 
consciousness of “so-and-so’s disciple” and the cruel, chaotic insanity 
reigning in the “School for Fools.” In Moscow to the End of the Line, death 
also stands out as the “last” and perhaps the only stable value in a 
catastrophically ambivalent world. The protagonist’s death turns the 
poem’s very text into a narrative of nonbeing, since the last sentence 
reads “A clotted red letter ‘Iu’ spread across my eyes and started to 
quiver. And since then I have not regained consciousness, and I never 
will.” [35] Yet in the given context death is imbued with a tragic value, 
assuring the protagonist-hero of a new and different existence as the 
author-creator, finally gaining a stable, otherworldly point of view, which 
in turn retrospectively sheds light on the text as a whole. Death does not 
bring closure to the narrative events, but rather opens them up to further 
interpretation. The moment interrupting the gradual course of events, the 
emptiness of nonbeing, paradoxically insures the story’s unity and flow. 
This model of textual integrity, based upon the unity of semantic spaces 
and structural breaks, most closely corresponds to the systemic principles 
of therhizome [36] described by Giles Deleuze [37] . In general terms, 
Deleuze delineates three groups of principles which characterize the 
rhizomatic system: 
1. Heterogeneity, the playful combination of different semiotic codes 
without undermining their internal integrity; multiplicity, the impossibility 
of singling out the system’s base. Rhizomatic multiplicity also denies any 
kind of transcendence, any additional dimension that would extend 
beyond its immediate multilinear space; 
2. Fragmentation -- ”A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, 
but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines.” [38]This 
principle is related to the transformation of the relationship between 
culture and reality; they are no longer connected by representation or 
mimises. The book and the world form a fragmented, yet internally 
integral rhizome; 
3. The rhizome is deprived of any transcendent deep structure, whether 
temporal or spatial -- it is all here and now; hence the rhizome’s 
incomplete nature: it has neither beginning nor end in any dimension; it is 
always in the middle of its dynamics, always in the process of 
development based on the interaction of heterogenous elements 
characterized by a single space-time status. 
The rhizomatic model of creative integrity differs cardinally from the 
models of integrity rooted in classical types of culture. It does not oppose 
fragmentation but rather presupposes it as an essential condition of its 
own realization. This type of creative integrity seems totally independent 
of the author’s efforts to organize his creation by means of plot 
manipulation, literary techniques, and so on (Bitov, Erofeev, and Sokolov 
all reveal this independence in different ways). Of course, this is an 
expertly crafted illusion of spontaneity in the creative world. But if this 
illusion is truly achieved, then the resulting integrity opens up to embody 
various meanings lying beyond the boundaries of the rational, 
deterministic world. Erofeev’s protagonist’s mystical epiphanies and the 
surreal liberty which Sokolov grants to his narrator are no accident, but 
make perfect sense in the context of this integral model. 
Rhizomatic principles also correspond with the unfolding of other, no less 
significant semantic oppositions in Russian postmodernism, also 
“stamped” with the rhizomatic compromise between fragmentation and 
integrity. Thus, the principle of multiplicity, heterogeneity, absent 
transcendence is most clearly realized in Russian postmodernists’ 
interpretation of the opposition between 
the personal and impersonal. Theoretically, postmodernism refutes the 
category of personality and the personal as one of the modernist 
“totalities.” However, in practice Russian postmodernism takes a slightly 
different approach. If, for example, Dmitri Prigov tirelessly demonstrates 
the fallacy of personality and personal self-expression as categories in his 
poetry, variously and methodically cataloging the different “automatisms” 
of quasi-personal assertion--from the purely ideological and thematic to 
those based on gender -- then Lev Rubinstein (as discussed earlier) 
reinstates personality over and in place of worn, faceless discursive 
material--as a combination of “foreign” elements, flowing but impossible 
to reproduce -- words, objects, quotations, gestures, images, and so on. 
This approach does not refute the category of personality as a unique, 
integral whole, but rather sees this integrity, this wholeness, much like a 
kaleidoscopic design: shifting, unstable, consisting of impersonal 
fragments. This approach appears even more distinctly in Timur Kibirov’s 
lyrics. Demonstratively using the most representative array, the most 
disparate quotations in conjunction with the most immediately 
recognizable details on the advantages of “social” life (from public toilets 
to the military), Kibirov consistently achieves a remarkably sincere effect -
- he is, perhaps, the most personal poet in contemporary Russian letters. 
Essentially, he does not refute postmodern determinism, but magnifies it 
instead. Kibirov asserts that chaos determines personality, which is 
thereby destined to be individual. His constant theme revolves around 
entropy, the disintegration of previously stable, almost calcified 
formations. But these decaying particles, tastelessly intermingled, settle in 
a specific, personal memory and consciousness, obeying the logic of chaos 
-- that is, capriciously and unpredictably--and therefore absolutely 
individually. Personal experience plays a unique role because its very 
nature is random and disorderly. At the same time, Kibirov’s lyrical 
consciousness is open to dialogue with a different consciousness, one 
which takes in the same entropic products, is comprised of the same bits 
and shards, but has formed a separate, also unique kaleidoscopic design 
(incidentally, this explains Kibirov’s penchant for lyrical missives to 
friends): 
This is all mine, familiar, 
This is all mine. 
Bold adventures, 
Stubbled harvest-fields, 
Birch and rowan trees, 
Rivers or TsK 
A political prisoner or a prick and a quarter, 
Or heartbreaking sorrow! 
. . . or a battle, or swede, 
An inventory of Khokhloma 
And we are sent off 
To three jolly letters. 
To L. S. Rubinstein [39] 
Of course, such a conception of personality precludes any sort of 
transcendence by “higher” values or arrangements. In this context, it is 
interesting to compare two “Buddhist” novels which came out in the 
1990s: The Monogram (1991) by Alexander Ivanchenko, a writer more 
indebted to modernism than to postmodernism, and Viktor 
Pelevin’s Chapaev and Emptiness (1996). Ivanchenko views Buddhism as 
a teaching about Truth, and quotes copiously and directly from Buddhist 
sutras and parables, explains meditation techniques to the reader, and 
constructs his entire story around the philosophic wisdom and saving 
grace of emptiness: at the novel’s end, the enlightened heroine discovers 
the attributes of the legendary Sixth Patriarch on her desk at work -- 
while formally remaining a modest librarian, she has experienced a 
spiritual transformation. Pelevin, on the other hand, uses Buddhism as an 
ironic metaphor for the absence of any transcendental explanation or 
justification of existence: his protagonist becomes convinced of the 
equivalence of reality and hallucination, or rather, in the end, loses all 
ability and desire to distinguish between them. This character -- the poet 
Peter Empty -- is simultaneously a psychiatric patient and commissar of 
Chapaev’s legendary troop. He comes to understand that his main goal is 
to “get himself out of the hospital,” that is, relinquish the quest for 
universal salvation and a single “true” reality and to accept that 
“personality is like clothing, taken out of the closet piece by piece, and the 
less real a person is, the more items of clothing are in his closet,” while 
there is “no one to wear them (the items of clothing).” [40] But to prevent 
anyone from taking this philosophy for actual Truth, Pelevin turns the 
well-known folkloric-cinematic hero Chapaev into an embodiment of the 
Buddha, and the widely recognizable anecdotes about Petka, Anka, and 
Chapaev into miniature parables similar to ancient Chinese koans (as 
noted by A. Genis and D. Bykov); this oxymoron deliberately undermines 
the seriousness of a reader’s response. 
The rhizomatic principle of intermittence and fragmentation, which 
presupposes the rhizome’s ability to regenerate from any point, inspires a 
paralogical reinterpretation of the opposition 
between memory and oblivion. The connection between these categories 
and conceptions of integrity is obvious: curiously, in the 1970s this very 
category of “memory” was perceived as a key condition of the integrity of 
the historical process and moral striving--to deny memory was to deny 
consciousness, social responsibility, and culture. Meanwhile, 
Bitov’s Pushkin’s House maintained that the most important condition for 
preserving unity and cultural integrity was not memory, but oblivion. M. 
Pavlovich Odoevtsev, the protagonist’s grandfather, asserts this same idea 
twice, at the novel’s beginning and end: 
The ties have been broken, the secret forever lost . . . a mystery is born! 
Culture remains only in the form of monuments contoured by destruction. 
A monument is doomed to eternal life, it is immortal merely because all 
that surrounded it has perished. In this sense, I’m not worried about our 
culture -- it has already been. It’s gone. It will exist in my absence, as a 
meaningless thing, for a good while longer. . . . All has perished -- and 
in this very hour the great Russian culture has been born, this time 
forever. . . . To our descendants, Russian culture will be a sphinx, just as 
Pushkin was the sphinx of Russian culture. [41] 
Here, as a general diagnosis, this formula is pronounced: “Unreality is a 
condition of life” (354). 
The formula’s meaning is clear: it establishes a connection between the 
contemporary protagonist’s artificial existence, his “unreal times,” and the 
cultural life of the Russian classics. M. P. Odoevtsev’s argument plots 
ambivalent coordinates for the image of Russian culture: here death 
becomes security, ruptured connections lend a classical sense of closure, 
non-existence predetermines grandeur. . . . Yet culture as a whole 
becomes closed off in this conception, senseless (as a factor of its 
impenetrability). Its context lies in the total destruction of reality; its 
effect is either muteness or incomprehension. Oblivion becomes the only 
possible form of cultural preemption: the novel’s main character, the 
philologist Liovushka Odoevtsev, realizes this function of connection 
through oblivion. 
This paradox is even more readily apparent in Vladimir Sharov’s 
novel Sooner or Later (1993) [42] . As previously mentioned, this novel 
represents a certain kind of meta-parody (though not comic in the least) 
of various mythologizations of Russian history. The narrator, Aliosha, a 
relatively young man, suffers spells of total amnesia and is therefore 
confined to the senilty unit in Kaschenko Hospital. Another character, 
Ifraimov, dictates to Aliosha his story of the relationship between the 
French writer Germaine de Stahl (who lived three human lifetimes) and 
the Russian philosopher Nikolai Fiodorov as a confession before God on 
the eve of the second Great Flood, explaining who really galvanized the 
Russian revolution. Unlike the other patients, Aliosha and Ifraimov remain 
at the hospital -- which doubles as an Ark -- along with Fiodorov and 
Madame de Stahl in “memory of that life.” At the same time, the final bout 
of amnesia before the Great Flood strikes Aliosha precisely at the moment 
when Ifraimov’s mythical version of the revolution and reality coincide, 
and Aliosha realizes that the elegant old woman in the next room is, in 
fact, Madame de Stahl, and the old man so obviously in love with her is 
the famous philosopher Fiodorov, and the shellshocked soldiers with 
whom the nurses are sleeping are not really soldiers at all, but Fiodorov’s 
children by Madame de Stahl, “those idiot children whom she bore in St. 
Petersburg, whom their father had never seen in their youth -- 
immediately following these words, as though I had truly needed them to 
fall asleep, darkness, an abyss. Whether I did anything else, spoke to 
anyone, I don’t remember; I am only aware that I was sick for a long, 
long time, almost for all eternity” (IV, 60). 
The narrator’s paradoxical mental states parallel the consciousness of 
other characters in the novel. In his amnesia, he resembles the oblivion in 
which Fiodorov lives out his romance with Madame de Stahl. This parallel 
is most apparent in the accumulation of mythological memory on 
the senility ward--hence, it becomes the Ark. 
The coincidence of the narrator’s realization of mythical reality with the 
moment of amnesia’s onset leads one to suppose that the “broken 
rhythm” of Aliosha’s consciousness is synchronous to the rhythm of 
history -- mythologized history, of course. For this reason, having 
recovered from his last bout with amnesia, Aliosha feels as though “not 
only I, but also those who never lost their memory understand nothing 
and are also afraid”(61). The moment of oblivion lies in the interval 
between repeating mythological cycles, and thus signals the moment of 
transition from historical time into eternity. Characteristically, the narrator 
describes amnesia as life’s circular point of closure: “Death waited behind 
me, not in the future. . . . I don’t know why, maybe because I was coming 
from the other end, but this life was very different from what I had 
imagined, and very different things wound up being significant”(III, 9). 
Fiodorov and Madame de Stahl find themselves in exactly the same 
position; they have outlived death (Fiodorov’s fictitious death, de Stahl’s 
real death), and much in the same way, their subsequent existence fills 
with meaning when they repeat events already lived through: in his 
hospital trysts with his lover, Fiodorov “repeated himself seventy years 
ago almost word-for-word”(70), while Madame de Stahl rejoices that the 
nurses “in their relationships with her sons almost literally reenact her 
affair with Fiodorov, and this makes them happy. Her former life was 
being lived anew, in triplicate”(71). Finally, even God repeats himself, 
arranging another Great Flood and choosing Noah (Fiodorov) to save 
mankind. 
On the other hand, none of this refutes the moment of remembering, 
recording history, but rather lends it special meaning: this history is saved 
for eternity, and no one can enter eternity without paying the price of 
death and oblivion. Essentially, this artistic conception of history’s discrete 
continuityis a particular conception of integrity which incorporates the 
necessary element of rupture, discontinuity, multiple versions--from 
memory lapse to death, from revolution to flood. This element shatters 
integrity into little pieces, breaks it into autonomous fragments, but the 
pattern of explosions traces a certain “ragged rhythm” -- though ragged, 
it remains rhythmic, that is -- ordered, “cosmic harmony” (O. M. 
Freidenberg). An order defined and created by its violations. Continuity, 
harmonized by the inevitability of rupture. 
A rhizomatic “cartography,” existence in the here and now, outside of any 
profound temporal or spatial structures (3), indirectly corresponds with 
the opposition between power and freedom. Dmitri Prigov explained 
conceptualism’s strategy thus: 
I have always understood that the main problem facing art, its purpose in 
this world, is to bear witness to absolute freedom, fully congnizant of the 
dangers. Art lets people view absolute freedom, which perhaps cannot be 
realized fully in life. I took Soviet language as the most functional, clear-
cut, and accessible example, which represented ideology and passed itself 
off as absolute truth, brought down from on high.Man was suffocated by 
this language, not on the outside but within. Any ideology which demands 
your heart and soul, any language, all have totalitarian ambitions to take 
over the whole world, strew it with their terminology, and show that they 
represent absolute truth. I wanted to show people that freedom 
exists. Language is only language, not absolute truth, and once we 
understand this we will be free. [43] 
Elsewhere he repeats this same thought regarding Sorokin: “...it seems to 
me that Sorokin’s position (as well as that of the entire movement to 
which he strives to belong) -- viewing freedom as the fundamental pathos 
of contemporary culture--is truly, if not singularly, humanistic.” 
[44] However, Russian conceptualism only engaged totalitarian discourse 
in its earliest period. Subsequently the experience of liberation from the 
tyranny of totalitarian language was applied by Sorokin and Prigov to any 
literary discourse -- from the language of Turgenev’s novels 
(Sorokin’s The Novel) to women’s lyrical language (Prigov’s “Women’s 
Super-Lyricism” and “Super-Women’s Lyricism”). In its own way, this 
makes sense: subsequent deconstruction reveals in any literary tradition 
such totalitarian qualities as the ability to create autonomous, 
mythological reality, direct (and manipulate) the reader’s perception, 
giving certain values preference over others. In principle, deconstructing 
literature as such leads to absolute freedom. But who can wield it? The 
individual personality is out of the question--according to conceptualism, 
any personality is never more than the product of discourse, totally 
enclosed in its framework. Nor can the author wield it, for the author has 
no language to express this freedom -- if every language is totalitarian, 
then freedom from the tyranny of discourse precludes the very possibility 
of expression. But the conceptualist text can truly translate any word -- 
however foreign or distant in time -- into the flat space of paper: any 
word is no more than uniform material subject to deconstruction. The 
greatest power belongs to whoever executes this operation before the 
eyes of his astonished readers -- that is, the conceptualist author. The 
author’s abstract freedom provides the means to realize maximal (at 
least, in today’s culture) power. Thus conceptualist practice turns freedom 
into a superpower. 
Incidentally, it is quite characteristic that Russian conceptualists, though 
omnivorous, still perfer to engage in discourses with the most 
authoritative energy -- they strive to “redistribute,” or more precisely, to 
appropriate this energy. In this sense, one might note Sorokin’s assertions 
that Russian literature is dead--which seems to mean that no sufficiently 
powerful discourses remain to validate conceptualism’s authority. 
Sorokin’s fascination with cinema and television points up that he 
continues to seek zones of discursive power, wherever they might be 
found. Sorokin’s latest work to date -- the screenplay “Moscow” (co-
authored by Alexander Zeldovich), [45] presents an interesting departure 
from the boundaries of intra-literary games, into the realm of “life.” 
Sorokin addresses the “New Russians” -- a new social class which 
indubitably possesses material and political, but not yet discursive, power 
-- a class still without a cultural language. Sorokin essentially offers them 
his services. He mixes a cocktail of surrealism, the classical figures of the 
three sisters (the three heroines -- two sisters and their mother, who 
nevertheless sleeps with the same men as her daughters do -- are named 
Olga, Masha, and Irina [46] ) and his own patented brand of naturalism, 
which in this case acquires all the meaning of “truth” in the lives of the 
“New Russians” with their Mafia connections, intrigues, and other horrors. 
[47] In a way, this is an honest move: rather than exploit the energy of 
existing powerful cultural discourses, it is logical to try to create a new 
discourse of power, as yet unformed in the culture at large. However, 
such a trajectory seems to lead beyond the boundaries of postmodernism, 
into a new normative realm which prefers power to freedom. The Russian 
avant-garde experienced a similar evolution, encountering this dilemma 
already in the 1920s: to perish or to dissolve its energy in the power of 
“government as the ultimate work of art” (H. Gunther). 
In 1985, Sasha Sokolov offered an unusual allegory for “paralogical” 
freedom’s transformation into a superpower in his novel Palisandria. His 
protagonist and narrator, Palisander Dahlberg, whom Sokolov imbues with 
all the polish of his own style, achieves the synthesis of all possible 
oppositions -- he is simultaneously man and woman, youth and old man, 
“freedom fighter” and the State’s darling, bully and victim, charmer and 
freak, and so on. In the long run, Palisander is truly free: every twist of 
fate is nothing more than his own deja vu--they have no power over him, 
nor do authority, time, or death (“There is no death!” -- he repeats this 
slogan throughout the novel). But the result of this freedom turns out to 
be absolute power for Palisander, who is anointed at the novel’s end as 
Russia’s eternal ruler (with the official title “Your Eternity”). Yet the author 
clearly feels uneasy with such freedom. “The author vomited,” reads a 
phrase in Palisandria’s epilogue. Having created his eternal freedom, 
Palisander himself admits defeat in the epilogue: 
You were so carried away that at times you imagined the text you were 
reading exempt from the time warps and whirlpools of relativity. You were 
mistaken. Although literature has till now been merely a timid exercise, a 
clumsy form of hieroglyphics, a tribute to human boorishness and 
savagery, nothing is exempt: every word of mine shall be lost. . . . And -- 
listen closely now!--everything that happened was in vain. Theabyss 
yawned, life cracked, and slowly it broke off. [48] 
Like any paralogical compromise, “freedom-power” propelled Palisander 
and conceptualism to self-abnegation and finally to chaos. Erasing 
distinctions between polarities inevitably devalues and empties them. In 
the end, existence becomes indistinguishable from non-existence -- both 
are equally simulative. As Palisander himself acknowledges in the final 
chapters: “Do not weep for me, O Russia, do not weep. For thou art no 
more. I am no more. We are gone. We have crossed over. We have fallen 
off . . . Where’s your country? . . .‘Forget her,’ an inner voice responded, 
‘forget her name. Your country is Chaos’” (373, 380). 
This metaphor may be applied to the rhizomatic model of creative 
integrity as well. It too cannot be stable in principle, for it borders on 
entropy by its very nature, tending toward self-destruction. Perhaps it 
initially requires a certain immaturity of poetics as system in order to be 
realized--a kind of “unreadiness”? But in that case will maturity and 
closure in postmodernist poetics necessarily lead to the extinction of 
rhizomatic integrity, turning it into sham spontaneity, an imitation, a flat 
plaster cast of endless metamorphoses? 
This question leads us to the next, perhaps most fundamental aesthetic 
opposition, which Russian postmodernism has transfigured into the zone 
of paralogical compromise. 
Chaos-Cosmos 
Joyce hit upon the best definition for this zone in his final 
novel, Chaosmos. What once seemed an extravagant play on words has, 
in the past decades, been imbued with concerete scientific meaning. Ilia 
Prigozhin, Benoit Mandelbrot, Mitchell Feigenbaum, and other “chaos 
theorists” have presented more than simply a new paradigm of scientific 
knowledge (incidentally, Lyotard developed his ideas about “paralogism” 
specifically in response to Mandelbrot’s arguments). Far more importantly, 
these chaos theories laid the foundation for a new, non-classical 
conception of systemic processes -- the cultural significance of this 
discovery cannot be overstated. Postmdernism evolved, one might say, 
along a parallel course, but within the same paradigmatic framework; 
therefore juxtapositions between chaos and postmodernist theories are 
quite natural [49] . 
Ilia Prigozhin defines chaos as a system whose activity counters “the 
indiscriminate disorder which reigns in a state of equilibrium: no stability 
can insure the veracity of macroscopic description, all possibilities are 
actualized, coexisting and interacting with one another, while the system 
simultaneously turns out to be all that it might be” (italics mine --M. L.). 
[50] To my mind, this definition profoundly corresponds to the Russian 
version of the postmodernist “paralogism.” By combining semantic polar 
opposites in paralogical compromises, Russian postmodernism achieves an 
effect of unprecedented fullness: the resulting creative system “turns out 
to be all that it might be” -- both fiction and reality; integral and 
fragmented; faceless and personal; the embodiment of memory and an 
emblem of oblivion; the realization of freedom and proof of power. That is, 
according to Prigozhin -- chaos. 
The central idea of “chaos theory” states that outwardly random 
conglomerates possess a particular inner organization and, moreover, can 
organize themselves. This is realized through a broad spectrum of 
conceptions about unstable, localized, and temporary orderings arising 
within a “chaotic” conglomerate; about cascading bifurcations propelled by 
random factors but vastly increasing a system’s level of self-organization; 
about “strange attractors” -- points surrounded by a whirling, disorganized 
stream and forming curiously systematic structures; and finally, about 
fractals, self-referential figures yielding such seemingly irregular 
formations as a picture of a shoreline or the pattern of frost on a 
windowpane, not literally, but structurally repeating a composition into 
infinity, in all its possible permutations and dimensions -- from micro to 
macrocosms. 
The rhizomatic model of postmodern art acts, of course, as a particular 
kind of “strange attractor.” Its shattered integrity, openness, indifference 
to ruptures, its ability to find itself always at the center of its own 
dynamic, correspond to such characteristics of strange attractors and 
particularly of fractals as infinity (when enlarged to any degree, the lines 
surrounding a strange attractor scatter along new, structurally identical 
trajectories), the necessity for an empty zone, a rupture (“physical 
unattainability”) in the structural make-up of any “attractor” or fractal, 
flow and instability (since fractal self-likeness establishes a direct 
correlation between macro and microcosms), and the constantly moving 
and changing outlines of fractal compositions--the direct result of the 
endless movements among molecules and other sub-particles. In such a 
system, flow appears to be a fundamental condition of stability: 
(it) can survive only by remaining open to a flowing matter and energy 
exchange with the environment. In fact, matter and energy literally flow 
through it and form it, like river water through a vortex. . . . The structure 
is stabilized by its flowing. It is stable but only relatively stable -- relative 
to the constant energy flow required to maintain its shape. Its very 
stability is also paradoxically an instability because of its dependence on 
its environment. [51] 
Consequently, if the rhizomatic structure endemic to postmodernist 
consciousness is that same “strange attractor,” and the postmodernist 
aesthetic might be characterized as chaotic, then one might suppose that 
the postmodernist aesthetic incorporated into texts which possess 
rhizomatic integrity might by this same token breed various forms of 
internal self-organization -- or “dissipative orders,” as Prigozhin calls them 
-- transfiguring postmodernist chaos into chaosmos. In any case, it is 
precisely the creation of this chaosmos that becomes the central effect of 
the posmodernist “paralogism” (at least, in its Russian permutation). 
Of course, this presupposition might (and probably should) be confirmed 
by examining the compromises which arise in Russian postmodernism 
between categories such as structure-amorphousness, randomness-
predictability, diabolical-godly, culture-nature, beauty-ugliness, and many 
others through which the fundamental opposition of chaos-cosmos has 
traditionally realized itself, from ancient times delineating the teleology of 
the aesthetic act. Such analysis exceeds the bounds of the present study. 
However, at least two principal conclusions may be drawn from the 
presupposition of chaosmos as the “value center” of postmodernist 
aesthetics. 
The first conclusion addresses the significance of the postmodernist 
“paralogism” for Russian culture. If the aforementioned presupposition is 
correct, then postmodernism radically undermines the ancient myth of the 
“poet (as) harmony’s son” (A. Blok), transforming the chaos of life (day-
to-day existence, history, routine, material life, etc.) into a new -- godlike 
or, on the contrary, competing with God--harmony. The essence of this 
mythology was not disturbed by the modernist and avant-garde 
rebellions, though of course, significant steps toward postmodernist 
chaosmos had already been made. Thus, even Blok prefaced his words 
about the “poet (as) harmony’s son” with: “The world’s order is 
troublesome; it is the offspring of disorder and may not correspond with 
our thoughts about good and evil.” [52] Yet postmodernist “paralogism” 
lends structual and semantic closure to this movement. This mythological 
revolution resonates most strongly in Russian culture. It is not simply a 
matter of undermining faith in the artist’s “godlike nature” -- and 
therefore in artistic expression of higher truths in an absolutely universal 
sphere of activity (“everything is ours”). Far more significantly, 
postmodernism essentially turns out to be the first creative system which 
deliberately sets out to destroy such fundamental elements of the Russian 
cultural tradition as the prevalence of dual models (see Lotman and 
Uspensky) [53] . The paradox lies in Russian postmodernism’s aim to 
destroy binary cultural consciousness using the same maximalism and 
radicalism that characterizes the Russian cultural tradition in the first 
place. Russian culture’s answer to the question of poetry after Auschwitz 
(or the GULAG) is an orientation toward chaosmos instead of harmony: 
aesthetic harmony is principally impossible (fictitious, simulative), while 
the flowing, unstable chaosmos forms the farthest horizon to which art 
may aspire. 
The second conclusion addresses postmodernism’s future. As stated 
before, the primary condition for such a system’s existence is flow -- the 
endless exchange of matter and energy with the surrounding 
envirionment. For a chaotic state to become ordered, it requires so-called 
backward loops, whereby the products of a system’s activity become 
preconditions for its existence (in chemistry these are known as 
autocatalysts). A chaotic system “closed up on itself” may be quite stable: 
Having once stabilized through a backward loop connection, a system past 
the threshold of bifurcation may resist further change for millions of years, 
until some critical interference breaks apart the backward loop connection 
and thus creates a new point of bifurcation. [54] 
If we expand this analogy (cautiously) and apply it to postmodernism, it 
becomes obvious that this creative system can actually exist only in the 
midst of a “foreign” and even hostile, un-postmodernist cultural 
environment. The more intensively postmodernist consciousness evolves, 
the more quickly postmodernism takes on qualities of a cultural 
monopoly--this process is taking place rapidly in Russia. In the absence of 
a core tradition of real pluralism and “cultural diversity,” postmodernism 
clearly fills the niche vacated by sociorealism, becoming a universal code 
not only in art, but also in mass culture, mass-media, and politics. A 
telling example is the connection between the postmodernist aesthetic and 
the new style of architecture in Moscow, as articulated by the critic 
Grigorii Revzin: 
Moscow’s Kremlin has become a key source of inspiration. To plan a 
building in Moscow taller than three stories and without turrets is like 
applying for a foreign visa during the years of Stagnation. It 
means officially declaring oneself a dissident. Government symbols, 
symbols of power, are everywhere. The orders are clear and are carried 
out swiftly. But something is wrong with this picture . . . all these turrets 
resemblecartoons. They are somehow random, like playthings.” 
Thus, for example, is Tsereteli an artist? Peter is, according to Revzin, 
nothing more than a toy transformer. Revzin offers a paradoxical but, in 
my view, precise explanation for the sovereignty of playthings: “. . .the 
role played by Culture Two [Vladimir Papernyi’s term designating the 
imperial cultural paradigm -- M. L.] in today’s Moscow embodies an almost 
unrecognizably mutated form of postmodernism. References to enduring 
symbols, historicism, repeating images -- today’s architect can incorporate 
all of this only through that style.” Of course, contradictions arise: “By its 
very essence, postmodernism cannot be Culture Two. It cannot assert 
ideas of collective unity revolving around national symbols. The rhetoric of 
national sovereignty is the same as Iurii Nikulin on the mausoleum’s 
tribunal.” In the author’s opinion, an unheard-of and theoretically 
impossible phenomenon has arisen: “the image of asserting power by 
deconstructing it. . . . That same Peter may be a toy, but he is still 
terrifying, as a cockroach grown to the size of a guinea pig is terrifying.” 
[55] 
By determinedly asserting itself in all spheres of cultural activity, Russian 
postmodernism moves toward closure in itself, reducing the possibility of 
dialogue with the outside cultural context to a minimum: squeezing out or 
subjugating other cultural languages, postmodernism forms its own 
cultural enviroment, thereby condemning itself to the use of the products 
of its own making. The resulting “backward loop connection” stabilizes the 
system to the point that it becomes a monument to itself -- that is, the 
flowing chaosmos of postmodernism will realign itself toward a new 
monumental normative state, much in the same way that baroque (which 
many scholars view as most historically analogous to postmodernism 
[56] ) prepared the soil for classicism. 
In this way the “postmodernist crossroads” in Russian culture may be 
characterized as both an outward and an inner tension between the 
traditional binary dynamic model and the paralogical strategy offered by 
postmodernism, which would create “neutral” but simultaneously 
conflicting spheres between aesthetic, philosophical, and ideological polar 
oppositions. 
Indeed, in the history of Russian culture, at least that of the twentieth 
century, postmodernism is the first to present such large-scale, open 
evidence that the simultaneous conflict and coexistence of differently 
aimed discourses are possible not only in abstract theory but also in 
concrete intellectual practice. Besides, Russian postmodernism cannot be 
separated from the Russian cultural context, and was forced to assert 
itself correspondingly with the demands of this context. Thus, along with 
the paralogical tendency, Russian postmodernism began to exhibit what 
one might call a tendency toward intertia, aimed to transform 
postmodernism into yet another mono-culture by means of a total break 
with the cultural past. At the end of the 1990s, Russian postmodernism 
resembles a typical Russian “new culture” -- ”which conceived of itself as 
the negation and complete annihilation of the ‘old,’ (but) was in practice a 
powerful means of preserving the latter,” according to Lotman and 
Uspensky. In Russian postmodernism, this tendency is tied to 
discrimination against all non-postmodernist cultural languages, the 
search for positions of power, and the formalization of dialogues and 
relationships with other discourses--cultural isolationism. 
Which of these tendencies will prevail? This depends largely upon the 
degree of responsibility with which Russian postmodernists approach their 
historical mission. Postmodernist paralogism can alter the algorithm of 
Russian cultural evolution if Russian postmodernists continue to struggle 
for domination, cultivate their own marginalism, coddle their opponents, 
and avoid the institutionalization of postmodernist culture like fire. Only 
“defeat” in the local historical context can lead postmodernism to victory 
on the “greater temporal scale” (Bakhtin) of culture. Unfortunately, at 
present the evolution of Russian postmodernism as a component of 
Russian culture in the 1990s tends in a diametrically opposite direction. 
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